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The use of contracts for producing and marketing agricultural commodities has
become nearly universal in some sectors.  For decades now, broilers and processed
vegetables have been produced almost exclusively under contract.  More recently, newly
developed high value grains, such as high-oil corn, have been produced exclusively under
contract.  In 1998, according to USDA, 35 percent of the total value of agricultural
commodities was produced or marketed under contract; 90 percent of this amount
focused on ten commodity groups.  Among the many factors mentioned as being
responsible for the use of agricultural contracts, two stand out.  The first, a demand-side
factor, is the development of strong consumer preferences for specific qualities.  When
this development occurs, manufacturers and other intermediaries will directly contract
with growers to ensure that they receive and pass on to consumers exactly the quality and
quantity desired (Drabenstott).   The second, a supply-side factor, is technological change
and resulting economies of scale.  Most technological change, the argument goes, has led
to larger operations and, thus, a need for greater supply-channel coordination, possible
through contracting (see Bieri, De Janvry, and Schmitz, 1972; Parlberg, 1981).
Both benefits and costs accrue to firms offering and producers using contracts.
Benefits to contractors include assured supply and uniform product quality while costs
include those arising from asymmetric information, including monitoring and contract
enforcement.  Benefits to farmers may include a reduction in price risk (Hueth and Ligon;
Featherstone and Sherrick) and increased financial leverage (Hennessey and Lawrence).
Among the greatest disadvantages to farmers is a loss of managerial control (Featherstone
and Sherrick, Hennessey and Lawrence).   For example, some broiler and potato
producers feel exploited (Baltimore Sun, Richards et al.) and some small family livestock3
farmers complain that they receive lower prices than their larger competitors (Knight-
Ridder, 3/4/2000).  On the other hand, an Iowa State University survey indicates that
many hog contractors were satisfied with contracting (Hennessey and Lawrence).
While the benefits and costs of contracting are well known, the trigger that shifts
transactions from the cash market to contracts is not well understood or documented.  In
this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that sheds light on a firm’s decision to use
the cash market or contracts by incorporating consumer demand, technology, and
transaction costs into the firm’s objective function.  The starting point for the analytical
framework is the interdependency between transaction costs and property rights. When
property rights are completely and perfectly specified, for example, it is not possible for
someone to have unauthorized access to the good or rents from the good.  If the rights are
imperfect, however, it is possible for another party to capture some of the rents, forcing
the owner to incur transaction costs to protect his rights over the good (Allen, Barzel).
Transaction costs include the cost of information, which includes the cost of determining
product quality and enforcing an agreement (North). One component of this is contract
enforcement, which includes ensuring that all contract terms are satisfied (including
quality specification, delivery, and payment).  Thus, efforts by seed and life-science
companies to prevent “illegal” seed saving can be viewed as transaction costs necessary
to maintain the property rights associated with the seed.
This analytical framework supports the idea that the shift from using the cash
market to contract transactions is an institutional response to the increased value of
property rights associated with a new production, processing, or marketing technology.
Property rights increase in value if changing consumer demand or technological4
innovation increases the technology owner’s potential benefits.  As the value of property
rights increases, more effort will be exerted to maintain and protect them.  For example, a
technological improvement may lower costs of production, yet require a specific and
uniform product quality.  This type of technology would be adopted only if the
production cost savings more than offset the added transaction costs required to establish
uniform quality.  Likewise, increased consumer demand for an identity-preserved product
may increase the potential benefits associated with technology ownership, yet also
require higher costs to monitor product quality.  When identity preservation is crucial,
such as for organically produced commodities or specialty grains, potential costs also
include market disappearance á la the standard lemons market problem. Contracting is
one way to prevent specialized commodities from “mixing” with generic commodities;
another way, a market based approach, is to rely on elaborate third-party certification,
such as that found in organic agriculture.  More generally, contracts can be favored over
cash market transactions when the increased ability to capture rents from higher-valued
property rights outweighs the increased transaction costs associated with contracts.
Using this logic, we would expect contracting to take place in sectors where there
are highly valued property rights associated with a product and where cash market
transactions inadequately protect these rights.  Specifically, these instances would include
sectors where (a) product quality, or uniformity of quality, is highly valued by processors
and/or consumers, (b) product quality is imperfectly reflected in the spot market, (c)
opportunistic or risk averting behavior by growers strongly affects transaction costs in the
cash market, and (d) individual capital constraints facing growers strongly affect
transaction costs in the cash market.5
We begin by modeling the choice to market inputs either through contracts or in
the cash market, using a stylized principal-agent relationship.  The framework embodies
the interplay between property rights and transaction costs, and indicates how a firm
might be willing to protect the value of its innovation by incurring high transaction costs.
We further consider how this decision might change as innovation occurs or demand for
specific attributes of quality increases.  Evidence from the broiler and high oil corn
1
industries is used to support our discussion.
The Game Set Up and Order of Play:
Using a stylized model, we explore a firm’s choice to offer inputs for either
private contract or cash market sales.  We model the transaction as a principal agent
problem, where a principal (henceforth called the processor) owns a specific asset, such
as high value seed or specialized technology, and wishes to transact with an agent
(henceforth called a grower).   We assume that both the processor and grower are risk
neutral, and are negotiating a one-time transaction.
2  The game between the two is played
in six stages as described below.
Stage 1: Processor owns marketing, processing, and input technologies; processor decides
whether to market its input through the cash market or a private contract.
Stage 2: Grower decides whether or not to accept the offered sale.
Stage 3: If the grower accepts the sale, the grower receives inputs and chooses the level
of effort to maintain the quality associated with the technology.
Stage 4: Nature moves, determining product quality.
Stage 5: Grower harvests output; quality is revealed through an observed quality
indicator; processor pays grower based on observed indicator.
Stage 6:  Processor resells output.
                                                
1 High-oil corn is targeted to the livestock industry as feed.  The corn has a higher protein and oil content
than ordinary feed corn, and substitutes for oil in livestock diets, subsequently reducing feed costs.
2 We make this assumption so that we can focus on the role of transaction costs, property rights, and
consumer demand on contracting decisions, rather than emphasizing how contracts share risk.6
In the first stage, an owner of a specialized technology, such as high-oil corn
seeds, young broilers, marketing technology, or specialized processing equipment
(denoted by t) decides whether to offer inputs for sale to growers through a cash market
or a private “care-taking” contract.  The specialized technology is exogenous, and
influences the potential quality of the final product, and therefore, the available rents.  In
the second stage, the grower faces either a specific “care-taking” contract or cash market
contract and decides whether or not to accept the contract.  The care-taking contract
specifies how the producer will care for the input throughout all stages of production and
marketing, while the cash market contracts contain no care-taking provisions.  We make
the simplifying assumption that the terms of the care-taking contract are fixed, ex ante,
and therefore establishing the transaction costs of the contract.
In the third stage, growers who accept either contract choose how much effort to
exert when producing and marketing the crop.   In the fourth stage, both contract and cash
market producers harvest output of quality z, which is a random function of level of input
technology and care taking effort.  The distribution, z(e; t), is common knowledge and
realized quality, z, is perfectly observable to all parties.  In the fifth stage, the technology
owner pays the grower.  Payment terms are specified in the care-taking or cash market
agreement and, in both cases, are based on realized quality.  In the sixth stage, the
processor resells output at a price that is increasing in observed quality, exogenous, and
common knowledge.
In order to characterize the equilibrium, we first examine the care-taking contract
and the cash market contract separately.  As modeled, each transaction (care-taking and
cash market) is a standard moral hazard problem, and each forms a separate subgame.7
After solving the contract sale and the cash market sale, we turn to the processor’s
marketing decision.  Equilibrium of the game has three dimensions: the share of inputs
sold under contract, prices paid to contract growers, and input prices for cash market
sales.
Stages 2 and 3 of the Contract Sale
In this transaction, the processor and grower agree to a private contract, where the
producer agrees to adhere to the processor’s care-taking provisions.  After harvest, the
producer turns the commodity over to the processor.  The equilibrium of the contracting
transaction is a set of prices that depends on the quality of the good the grower returns to
the processor.  Implicitly, this equilibrium depends on the grower’s optimal level of
effort, the grower’s reservation wage, technology, and consumer demand.  To
characterize this equilibrium, we first turn to the constraints on the optimal contract.
 The processor, in order to induce the grower to participate in the contract, offers
the grower expected profits at least equal to her next-best alternative.  The producer’s
expected benefits satisfy the following individual rationality constraint:
(4) E{w(z(e*;t ))– c(e*) ‡ p1,
where p1 is the grower’s reservation wage, w(.) is the offered wage schedule, and c(e) is
the producer’s cost of effort.  Intuition suggests that expected contract wages are bounded
from below by expected cash market prices.  Alternatively, when no cash market exists,
contract wages are bounded from below by expected cash market prices for a different
crop.  For example, high-oil corn contracts specify some (per bushel) premium schedule,
using the Chicago Board of Trade price for No. 2 yellow corn as the base price.8
Given the offered wage schedule, a risk-neutral grower picks her own effort level to
maximize her expected net benefit:
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(1) 
e max (E{w( z(e; t))})  – c(e),
Her expected revenues, the first term in (1), depend on realized quality, which is
determined by the stochastic relationship between effort and technology.  This decision
leads to the following first-order condition, often called the “incentive-compatibility”
constraint:
(2) E{w’(z(e*; t )¶(z(e*;t ))/¶e*}  = c’(e*),
where e* is the level of effort that maximizes (2). Another interpretation is that the
principal offers the proper incentives (in this case, wage schedule) to induce the agent to
exert the level of effort desired by the principal.
With the above constraints in mind, then, the processor chooses the wage
schedule to maximize expected profits.  The processor (technology owner) maximizes
expected profits:
(3) 
w max  Ep = E{B(z(e; t); h,t) }  - E{w( z(e; t))} – C1
TX,
The first term in the equation is the processor’s expected benefit from the sale of
processed output, which depends on output quality (z), technology (t), and an exogenous
demand shifter (h).  We assume that expected benefits increase when the exogenous
demand shifter increases consumer demand, and when there is innovation in input,
processing, and marketing technology. Increases in effort are expected to increase the
                                                
3 A risk-averse agent would maximize expected utility.  Under the assumption of no wealth effects,
expected utility could be approximated by subtracting the risk premium associated with the expected
income.9
quality outcome and, in turn, the processor’s proceeds.  The second term, E{w( z(e; t))},
represents the expected wage schedule from the processor to the grower, given output
quality z(e; t).  The third term, C1,
TX  is the transaction costs of the sale between the
grower and processor.  These costs, fixed in the short run, are all the ex ante and ex post
costs of the transaction, including costs of writing and enforcement, and could potentially
include recruiting and training costs.
Stages 2 and 3 of the Cash Market Sale
In the cash market sale, the processor offers the input for sale to growers at a price
v.  The equilibrium price depends on all parameters, including technology, consumer
demand, and the producer’s reservation wage.  After harvest, the processor repurchases
the grower’s output according to a market price schedule, p(z(e; t)), which is exogenous
and known ex ante to the processor and grower, and increasing in quality.
As in the contract subgame, the grower chooses her effort by maximizing
expected net benefits:  
e max E{ p( z(e; t)) – c(e)}.  For a risk-neutral grower, this decision
leads to the following first-order condition:
(4) E{ p’( z(e**; t))
* *






In other words, in equilibrium, the producer exerts effort until the point where
expected marginal benefit from increased effort equals the marginal cost of effort.  The
processor, to guarantee grower participation, ensures that prices satisfy:
(5) E ={ p( z(e; t)) - v) – c(e) ‡ p0,10
where p0 is the reservation wage.
4
In the cash market sale, the processor selects v, the input price, to maximize
expected profits subject to the producer’s participation and incentive constraints:
(6) 
v max  Ep = E{B(z(e; t)); h,t) }  - [E{ p( z(e; t))} - v)] – C0
TX,
where C0
TX are the costs associated with transacting in the cash market.
Optimal Level of Effort for Cash Market and Contract Sales
Given the differences between the endogenous wage schedule w(.) and the
exogenous price schedule, p(.), logic suggests the contract sale can induce a level of
grower effort at least as high as the cash market sale can, or that e* ‡ e**. The expected
marginal benefit that a grower receives from expending extra effort is E{w’(z(e; t




¶ ) ; ( t
} from cash market
sales.   In each case, expected marginal benefits depend on how responsive the price or
wage schedule is to quality.  Processors cannot directly influence effort in cash market
sales because the market price schedule is exogenous.  Processors can, however,
manipulate the grower’s decision to participate through the choice of the input price, v.
Alternatively, contract provisions are under the direct control of the processor.  Hence,
the processor has control over expected quality and, to lesser degree, realized quality in a
contract sale.  The processor could, in fact, force producer effort in the contract sale to
exactly duplicate producer effort in the cash market sale by setting Ew(.) equal to Ep(.).
Whether a risk-neutral producer would accept such a contract would depend on the cost
                                                
4  It may simplify the analysis to think of p1 and p0 as equal reservation expected net income levels.
However, because the reservation wage may depend on the presence of an functioning cash market, they
may be different for each subgame.11
of effort in the care-taking contract relative to cash sale.  Ultimately, in our risk-neutral
world, the processor can entice higher effort by offering a higher expected wage in the
contract sale.
The Principal’s Marketing Decision
After solving the two subgames, our attention returns to the processor’s decision,
in which the processor maximizes expected profits by choosing either a specific contract
or cash market transaction.  Here, the processor chooses the share of contract or cash
market sales, denoted by d, to:
(7) 
d max Ep = E{B(z(e; t); h,tP)} - d E{w( z(e; t))}  - (1-d)[ E{p(z(e; t))}- v] - Cd
TX,
where 
d = (0,1) is an indicator of a cash market (d = 0) or contract (d = 1) transaction;
and
Cd
TX = the fixed transaction cost to the processor, which depends on the choice of
d.
The problem, given its current structure, has a corner solution, so that in
equilibrium, all transactions will take place under contract or in the cash market.
5
Solving  for the optimal marketing choice, cash market or contract, involves comparing
expected profits under the two possibilities.  One finds contracting to be optimal, d = 1,
when expected net benefits from contracting exceed the expected net benefits from cash
market sales:
(8) E{B(z(e*;t); h,t)} - E{w( z(e*; t))}  – C1
TX) ‡
      E{B(z(e**;t); h,t)} - [ E{p(z(e**;t))}- v] – C0
TX,
                                                
5 Given that growers are homogenous and risk neutral, and that only one caretaking contract is offered, in
equilibrium processors will offer only cash market sales or contract transactions.  Introducing different
levels of contracts or allowing growers to vary by type (and risk preference might define types) would
enable processors to offer both cash market and contract transactions in equilibrium.12
where e* and e** are the equilibrium levels of effort from the contract and cash market
sales.  Alternatively, selling in the cash market is optimal when the inequality in (8) is
reversed.  Note that each side of the inequality in (8) has three similar terms: the expected
benefit from the sale of the harvested commodity, the net expected payment to growers,
and the transaction costs associated with each type of sale.  Collecting terms allows us to
discuss the nature of the inequality more clearly:
(8')  [E{B(z(e*;t); h,t)} - E{B(z(e**;t); h,t)}] ‡
 [C1
TX – C0
TX] +  [ E{w(z(e*;t))}- [E{p(z(e**;t))}- v] ].
The left-hand-side term is the difference in expected benefit from contract and cash
market sales, while the right-hand-side terms are the difference between transaction costs
and the growers’ increased expected wage under the two scenarios. Therefore if the
inequality in (8’) holds, the processor’s expected net benefit from contracting exceeds the
processors additional costs of contracting, and contracting is preferred.
A processor’s expected proceeds are likely to be higher from contracting than
from cash market sales if three conditions are met: (i) if contracting can induce a higher
effort from the grower than does a cash market transaction, (ii) if proceeds are highly
responsive to quality and, hence, effort, and (iii) if market proceeds are adversely affected
by quality deterioration (a lemons problem).  In a sense, each of these three conditions
describes a separate stage in the marketing chain.  Condition (i) applies to the production
stage; condition (ii) applies to the marketing stage; and condition (iii) applies to the
consumption or final demand stage.13
Contracting Responses to Innovation and Demand Shifts
Our main concern is the processor response to technological innovations and
shifts in consumer demand; our thesis is that under certain conditions, the processor’s
optimal response is a shift from cash market sales to contracts.   Hence, our goal is to
examine how (8’) responds to changes in technology and changes in consumer demand,
h, to gauge whether these shifts will make contracting more or less likely.  To evaluate
changes in (8’), we examine how changes in technology and consumer demand alter the
processor’s expected net benefits from contracting by examining processor expected
benefits, expected grower compensation, and transaction costs.  In doing so, we rely on
evidence from the broiler and high oil corn industries.
Technological Innovation
We first turn to technological innovation, and examine the impact of changes in
technology on the processor’s marketing decision by rewriting (8’) as follows, where t
?
represents a higher technology level:
(9) E{B(z(e*;t
?); h,t)- w(z(e*;t
? ))} - E{B(z(e**;t





The first two terms represent the expected net benefits from contracting and cash
market sales, respectively.  The right side represents the difference in transaction costs
between the two contracts, which, for notational simplicity, is henceforth referred to as
?C
TX. Restating an earlier conclusion, contracting is optimal when the left side of (8’)
exceeds the right side.
Technological innovation enters the processor’s marketing decision in several
ways.  First, based on our assumptions, there will be higher expected quality for each14
level of effort, which will indirectly increase expected benefits. Technology has a direct
effect on processor expected benefits, too, through reduced production costs, more
efficient marketing, or other efficiency gains from the new technology.  Finally, the
optimal contract wage and cash market price schedules will respond to the new
technology, changing the optimal effort levels in the two cases. Just how the processor’s
expected payment to the producer changes depends on the responsiveness of the grower’s
net payment to an increased maximum quality.  Whether the higher technology ultimately
leads to a switch from cash to contract sales depends on the net effect of all these factors.
To gain insight, we turn first to the broiler industry and next to the high oil corn
industry.  Technological advances set the stage for a switch in the broiler industry, from
small, independent production to an industry dominated by contracts.  Technological
advance brought new feed formulations, automatic feeding, and breeding increased the
size of flocks, subsequently increasing capital requirements (Martinez).  In general, as
production costs fell in the broiler industry, producers and integrators were willing to
incur higher transaction costs to protect the now more valuable property rights associated
with larger flocks and more expensive capital and feed formulations.  Larger feed
companies soon offered and established production contracts with growers, offering
growers inexpensive risk mitigation while maintaining or protecting the property rights
by assuring a market for their feed formulations.  Further technological change in the
industry resulted in chicken processors replacing feed suppliers as primary integrators.
Turning next to high-oil corn, we first note that virtually high-oil corn all has been
produced under contract since DuPont introduced the product to the market in 1992,
when less than 50,000 acres were planted.  Around 1996, a relatively inexpensive (less15
than $30,000) portable piece of equipment able to measure oil content became available,
making it inexpensive to write and enforce contracts that pay growers based on oil
content.  Acres of high-oil corn planted doubled after the equipment became available.  In
1996, 370,000 acres were planted, in 1997, 750,000 acres, and about 1 million acres in
1999.
As these two industries indicate, technological innovation (input, marketing and
processing, or contract enforcement) is likely to make contracting more attractive for
three reasons.  First, a contract arrangement can induce a higher effort level from the
grower, which is now potentially more advantageous with the technological innovation.
For example, high-oil corn contracts use a premium schedule, rewarding the grower for
producing higher quality, which suggests that a grower’s management practices have a
large impact on final quality. Broiler contracts, which use relative performance
compensation schemes, have strong incentive components to induce high levels of effort.
A broiler grower’s incentive payment is based on relative feed efficiency, an incentive
measure that induces both quality-enhancing and yield-increasing effort.  Second, a
contract protects the processor from an increased potential of quality mixing, a costly
externality that exists primarily due to cash market transactions.  For example, broiler
processors required uniform quality, which was and still is ensured through common
genetics and proper management. Because many contract growers supply a single
processing facility, the processor requires each grower to adopt similar management
practices to assure uniform quality.  High-oil corn contracts similarly require growers to
produce an identity-preserved crop, and specify specific production, harvest, and storing
techniques to ensure that the crop’s identity is preserved.  Finally, lower contract16
enforcement costs make contracting profitable at lower expected benefit differentials.
For example, contracting for high-oil corn rapidly increased after an inexpensive method
of detecting oil content became available.
If, at the higher level of input technology, the net expected benefits exceed the
difference in transaction costs between contract and cash market sales, the processor will
offer contract sales.  Thus, if sales were previously made in the cash market, the
processor will choose to offer contracts if the net expected benefits are large enough to
compensate for the higher transaction costs.  In a more complicated world where a
spectrum of contracts exists, innovation can lead to choosing a contract with higher
transaction costs to protect property rights more effectively.  For example, the processor
might be willing to spend more time or money to train and recruit growers.  Additionally,
a technological change may induce a processor to write a more complex contract, for
example, that places greater constraints on the producer’s behavior.
6  Thus, technological
change in inputs, which generally increases the property rights, might induce a processor
to willingly incur higher transaction costs to protect the property rights.  The idea of
adapting contracting arrangements accompanying technology innovation is clearly
demonstrated in the broiler industry.  Initially, feed suppliers were the primary
integrators.  As processing and marketing innovations increased the value of particular
breeding lines and processing technologies, processors stood to gain more by protecting
and maintaining the property rights associated with the final product than did the feed
companies by protecting and maintaining the property rights associated with the feed.  As
a result, today, most major chicken processors control all the vertical stages, and breed17
the parent stock, produce the hatching eggs, and provide baby chicks, feed, veterinary
services, and technical advice to growers under contract.  Put another way, the processor
incurs substantial transaction costs to guarantee that uniform-quality birds enter its
processing plants.
At the same time, high oil corn contracts are designed to protect DuPont’s
property rights over the high value seed. Virtually every contract requires a grower to (i)
produce and deliver an identity-preserved crop, (ii) deliver the entire crop to DuPont’s
marketing agent, Optimum, or an agent of Optimum, (iii) purchase seed from specified
companies, and (iv) provide Optimum with free access to her fields.   Moreover,
minimum quality standards are explicit, and include thresholds for acceptable levels of
moisture content, weight, aflatoxin, and damage.  In our property rights framework, these
provisions work to secure DuPont’s property rights over the seed innovation.  For
example, the four common provisions maintain crop integrity and thus its value.   By
limiting delivery to certain agents (usually grain elevators, end users, or exporters) and
requiring that growers purchase seed from specific companies, the seed innovator is able
to monitor specialty grain crop quality and, again, its value.
In sum, then, increases in technology are likely go along with higher transaction
cost contracts, made possible by an increase in property rights value and potential
processor benefits.  In other words, a technology increase expands the feasibility of a
whole range of contracts, some of which carry high transaction costs. Prior to the
technology increase (that is, at a lower level of processor expected benefits), many of
these contracts were not economically feasible.  This finding suggests that industry-
                                                                                                                                                
6 An exception might occur if the innovation reduces the cost of observing quality.  That is not the case18
specific parameters crucially affect the relative size of benefits and transaction costs, and
have an impact on the processor’s optimal marketing strategy: in our case, cash market or
contract sales.
Changes in Consumer Demand
Analyzing the effects of an increase in consumer demand is slightly easier
because consumer demand directly impacts only one term, the expected benefits to the
processor.  Consumer demand, however, has an indirect effect on equilibrium effort.  The
direct and indirect effects enter the processor’s profits as follows:
(10)  E{B(z(e*;t); h
?,t)- w(z(e*;t ))} - E{B(z(e**;t); h




Increased consumer demand increases the value of the processor’s property rights, which
manifests as an increase in the processor’s expected benefits.  The higher expected
benefit increases the likelihood of contracting, as processors are willing to incur
transaction costs to preserve the more valuable property rights.  For example, as the
market for the maximum quality product (e.g., high-oil corn) gets stronger, the potential
losses from identity deterioration increase.  The processor would be expected to induce
extra effort and reap additional benefits in the final product market by requiring the
grower to take steps to preserve product identity.  Another example is increased
consumer demand for particular attributes, such as “pesticide free” and “non-GMO”.
Nearly all fruit and vegetable contracts between producers and baby food manufacturers
include provisions for ensuring that the final product is pesticide free.  In the same vein,
some manufacturers of chips and candy are adding contract provisions requiring
producers to use only nonGMO products.  In both cases, processors are willing to incur
                                                                                                                                                
modeled here.19
the higher contracting costs in order to meet consumer demand, because the cash market
is unlikely to provide the same attribute assurances.
Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to show how the decision to contract can be
framed as an institutional response to changing industry and market conditions. More
specifically, we have argued that when innovations increase available rents to technology
owners, contracts can replace cash market transactions even though contracts carry higher
transaction costs.  In the broiler industry, for example, technological innovations gave
processors and their agents the ability to produce a steady, assured supply of near-
uniform quality birds and, in turn, the ability to capture rents in the processing and
marketing channels.  One of the costs of capturing these rents, however, was the high
costs incurred to recruit, train, and monitor broiler growers and enforce contracts.
Likewise, in the high-oil corn industry, genetic improvements, new seed formulations,
and inexpensive monitoring equipment gave seed manufactures and their agents the
ability to produce a highly valued, identity-preserved product.  Again, the cost of
capturing the rents associated with these improvements was the high transaction cost
associated with contracting.  At the root of both these stories is the notion that innovation
increased the value of the technology owner’s property rights and higher costs are likely
to be incurred to maintain and protect these rights.
We have also argued that changing consumer preferences can similarly increase
the value of property rights, and thus stimulate higher transaction costs.   In the broiler
industry, increased demand for packaged poultry coincided with technology innovations;
and in the high-oil corn industry, a preference for the new corn has developed among20
feed companies.  In both these cases, processors and consumers require a high-quality, a
uniform-quality, and/or an identity-preserved product.  Quality or identity maintenance,
however, lead to higher transaction costs between processors and growers.
Using a stylistic model, we have tried to examine the market conditions that
would favor contracting over cash market transactions.  The model compartmentalizes
the problem into two subgames within a larger processor-grower game.  We find that the
contracting decision is dependent on several exogenously determined factors, including
(i) the responsiveness of processor benefits to quality, (ii) the responsiveness of the
market price to quality, (iii) the level of transaction costs associated with contracting, (iv)
the differential between the improved input and a conventional input, (v) the level of
consumer demand, and (vi) the grower’s reservation wage.  In broilers, for example,
contracting emerged quickly because, among other reasons, processor benefits were
highly responsive to quality, consumer demand increased steadily, and growers had low
reservation wages.  Contracting in high-oil corn likewise has been swift because
processor benefits were highly responsive to quality, there was a larger differential
between the improved and conventional inputs, and demand for the identity-preserved
product is strong.
That these results and arguments are intuitive is not surprising.  What is
promising, however, is how easily they fall out of a very simple model based on a very
simple processor-grower game.  Useful next steps will include elaborating on the model
to fully account for production and price risk, allowing a broader spectrum of contract
types – each with different transaction costs, and allowing for multiple processors – each
owning technology of different quality.  21
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